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From Here to There: Lessons from an 
Integrative Patient Safety Project in  
Rural Health Care Settings 
Ann Freeman Cook, Helena Hoas, Katarina Guttmannova 
Abstract 
To date, few studies have focused on patient safety issues that occur in rural 
health care settings. This article presents and discusses the methodology and the 
key findings obtained from a multi-method research study of patient safety in 
rural health care settings, funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality. Interdisciplinary teams of health care providers from 30 rural hospitals 
and Indian Health Service settings in a nine-state area of the West participated in 
this initiative. Study instruments included surveys, interviews, and textual 
analysis of responses to case studies. Data indicate that health care providers 
strongly affirm the importance of patient safety and want access to guides and 
resources that help achieve that goal. However, the lack of shared agreement 
regarding the definition, recognition, responsibility, reporting, and disclosing of 
errors compromises the development of a patient safety agenda. Using e-mail and 
a secure Web site, the authors developed a model for retrieving data, increasing 
discussion, providing resources, and disseminating findings. 
Introduction 
Up until now, most of the patient safety initiatives following the publication 
of the Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System1 have focused on urban and tertiary care settings. Thus, little is known 
about the status of patient safety initiatives in rural areas or the extent to which 
urban interventions can be transplanted into rural settings. To respond to this 
lacuna, our research focuses on the working conditions in rural health care 
settings and the factors that shape recognition, reporting, disclosure, and 
resolution of patient safety issues (including errors and adverse events). Because 
little information in this area was available at the time this study was initiated, we 
designed an exploratory, multi-method approach that could help explicate the 
complex individual and organizational processes that influence the development 
and acceptance of patient safety measures in rural health care settings.
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
We enrolled interdisciplinary teams of 3–5 health care providers (physician, 
nurse, pharmacist, and administrators, including quality control personnel) in 30 
hospitals in a 9-state area of the rural West. The participants also included health 
care providers who worked in the Indian Health Service (IHS) settings. The use of 
a multi-state area for this study ensured that participating hospitals would not be 
identified and allowed us to examine issues across different systems. In each 
hospital, one team member served as a key contact. The hospitals that participated 
in this research were representative of those found in states with large rural 
populations.2 They included acute care facilities (69 percent), or a combination of 
acute and long-term care facilities (31 percent); the majority (75.9 percent) had 
fewer than 50 acute care beds. More than half of the participating hospitals (51.7 
percent) lacked Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 
(JCAHO) accreditation and 44.8 percent lacked ethics committees. While most 
hospitals had an onsite pharmacy (82.8 percent), only 34.5 percent had a full-time, 
onsite pharmacist. All of the hospitals had access to the Internet. 
Study protocol 
The multi-method research agenda involved seven sub-studies. The 
instruments for the quantitative studies included a hospital data sheet and three 
surveys: a Close-Call Pilot Safety Culture Assessment, developed by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs; an Error Tool Survey and a Patient Safety Staff 
Survey that were developed by the investigators.3 The hospital data sheet, 
completed by the key contact in each hospital, provided baseline organizational 
data. The Safety Culture Assessment, completed by all the team members, 
assessed attitudes and beliefs relative to the recognition, reporting, and disclosing 
of errors. The Error Tool Survey, also completed by team members, assessed the 
kinds of errors that were actually reported in participating hospitals. The Patient 
Safety Survey, distributed to staff in the participating hospitals, assessed 
organizational processes, as well as attitudes and behaviors. 
The qualitative studies included quarterly interviews with the key contact in 
each hospital, e-mail questionnaires, and textual analysis of team member 
responses to two-to-three case studies per month. The interviews provided the 
opportunity to discuss, in greater depth, the kinds of patient safety issues that 
developed in each hospital, as well as the individual and organizational processes 
that were used to respond to them. The e-mail questionnaires allowed us to 
explore information about specific issues, such as pharmacy protocols when 
questionable orders were received. The case studies, also e-mailed to team 
members, were based on the kinds of patient safety issues that occur in rural 
hospitals. Each case study included a series of companion questions to which 
participants were encouraged to respond, which provided a mechanism to 
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discover what kinds of events were recognized as errors. With the permission of 
the participants, responses to the case studies were posted anonymously on a 
discussion board located on a secure Web site. All participants had access to the 
Web site. 
As data emerged and was analyzed, results and resources were shared with 
participating team members in each hospital via the web site and ongoing emails. 
The team members, in turn, disseminated resources to other health care providers 
in their respective systems. This cyclical methodology forged an ongoing 
relationship between the researchers and the research participants, and also 
allowed the findings from each sub-study to inform the development of the next 
round of enquiry. 
The flexibility of this methodology also allowed for an expansion of the 
original research agenda via a collaboration with Rush Medical College, Chicago. 
An interdisciplinary patient safety team, under the direction of Dr. Robert 
McNutt, also received and analyzed the rural case studies. This endeavor led to 
the development of a case study model that includes a description of the topic and 
outlines key issues, learning points, clinical guides, and suggestions for 
improvement. Researchers at the University of Montana distributed the model 
summaries, via e-mail, to the rural team members who then reviewed and 
critiqued the summaries so that they could be revised, when needed, to more 
realistically accommodate the rural context. 
This dynamic exchange of information between Rush Medical College and the 
rural sites showcased the challenges and uncertainties that accompany any 
discussion of patient safety. Even when there is agreement as to the technical 
definition of errors, the application of the definition in particular cases can prove 
problematic. The lack of definitive clinical guides or standards can make it 
difficult to categorize diagnosis and treatment issues as errors. Differences of 
opinion were welcomed and, at times, the development of a summary required 
several iterations and revisions. Rather than proving cumbersome, however, this 
process seemed to facilitate trust. Rural health care providers applauded the 
willingness of their colleagues at Rush Medical College to revisit, reconsider, and 
revise. 
Admittedly this methodology is time-consuming for the researchers and the 
research participants because it involves a continual process of data collection, 
analysis, reporting, product development, and dissemination. In addition, the 
researcher assumes the role of a facilitator. However, the researchers and 
participants receive information and resources that they value, and so the 
constraints appear to be offset by the benefits. For example, each hospital that 
participated in the staff patient safety survey received a detailed report that 
summarized key findings from the individual hospital as well as the group 
responses. Some of the findings then led to changes in hospital practices or 
policies. The case studies provided a blameless way for health care providers to 
present and discuss patient safety issues that could—and did—occur in rural 
hospitals. One nurse noted, “That could definitely happen here; it has happened 
here. But it came from somewhere else so we could talk about it.” Through this 
Advances in Patient Safety: Vol. 1 
 384
dialogue, health care providers learned of the extent to which they lacked shared 
agreement of definitions of errors. In return, health care providers scheduled time 
for interviews, provided responses to case studies and questionnaires, and 
participated in the various survey activities. The success of this approach is 
evidenced by the fact that after nearly three years, none of the original hospitals 
has left the study, new hospitals have joined, and health care providers remain 
actively engaged in a dialogue. 
Results 
While a more extensive description of the results can be found in our cited 
publications,4–12 the following section summarizes findings from several parts of 
the study, in order to allow for a meaningful discussion. Overall, the findings 
derived from this study highlight the complexity and the interdisciplinary scope of 
the patient safety problem, including factors related to the cognitive aspects of 
error-related processes (the differential recognition of error across disciplines); 
behavioral aspects (perception vs. action); and organizational structures (reporting 
mechanisms, barriers, and outcome measures).3 
Cognitive aspects of error-related processes 
Our data indicate that rural health care providers uniformly rated themselves 
as concerned about patient safety and, when completing organizational culture 
and climate assessments, consistently rated their institutions and themselves as 
proactive, supportive of non-punitive approaches, willing to report errors, and 
able to initiate actions that increase safety. While these findings initially appeared 
to be quite reassuring, our data also indicate that health care providers varied in 
their ability to recognize errors, allocate responsibility for patient safety, design 
interventions that increase patient safety, implement new practices, and sustain 
change. Among the health care disciplines there were vastly different perceptions 
as to what constitutes an error, who is a member of the patient care 
decisionmaking team, who holds responsibility for patient safety, and how errors 
should be disclosed and resolved.3  
Behavioral component of error-related processes 
When health care providers completed surveys that assessed the kinds of 
errors they actually reported and their experiences associated with those reports, 
narrow—and oftentimes divergent—definitions of errors emerged. Health care 
providers primarily recognized and reported medication-related errors and patient 
falls. The medication errors generally involved one of three issues: incorrect dose, 
time, or port. Although most of the health care providers viewed their role in 
reducing medical errors as reporting errors; making recommendations for 
procedure and policy changes; reviewing reported events; and participating in the 
investigation of causes, actually engaging in these processes was recounted by 
few. Only a minority of health care providers reported participation in any error-
resolution process including the investigation of errors, review of errors, or 
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analysis of errors.12 Indeed only 9 percent to 15 percent of health care providers 
had ever participated in processes such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) or Root Cause Analysis. 
Organizational structures 
Health care providers also reported that they encountered barriers that 
impeded reporting, such as short staffing; use of temporary staff; lack of time; 
disagreement as to what constitutes an error; lack of feedback about corrective 
steps; peer pressure; lack of confidentiality; and lack of mandatory reporting 
systems. In addition, a range of fears associated with economic, ethical, legal, and 
psychological consequences appear to influence decisions relative to recognizing, 
reporting, disclosing, and resolving errors. A vast majority of our team members, 
as well as surveyed hospital staff (Staff Patient Safety Survey), indicated that they 
would like to receive additional resources and information about standards of 
practices of care; changes in procedures; clinical guidelines; general statistics 
about trends; and the summary of events related to patient safety and medical 
errors.12 
The interplay among factors 
These three domains—cognitive, behavioral, and organizational—provide a 
backdrop for understanding the way health care providers recognize, report, and 
disclose errors. For example, when case studies depicted medication errors 
associated with the wrong dose, time, or port, these were usually recognized as 
errors, identified as such, and attributed to nursing. However, when the case 
studies contained errors associated with diagnosis and/or treatment, included in 
the Institute of Medicine’s definitions of errors (delays in treatment; use of 
outmoded treatments; failure to employ needed tests; failure to act on results of 
testing; errors in diagnosis and administration of treatment; or failure to 
communicate), the health care providers were hesitant to acknowledge that an 
error had occurred.1 Physicians, for example suggested that such cases 
represented not errors, but practice variances, sub-optimal outcomes, or clinical 
judgments. At times, they noted the need for more aggressive management but 
use of the word “error” or “mistake” was consistently avoided. Physicians also 
noted that they did not judge one another’s decisions and did not look in one 
another’s charts. Thus, when responding to case studies, they often believed that 
specific interventions, such as disclosure to the patient, notations in the chart, 
referral to a hospital-based Morbidity and Mortality meeting (M&M), or filing of 
incident reports, were unnecessary. 
Nurses who responded to the case studies were also hesitant to designate 
treatment and diagnostic issues as errors, noting that they lacked the authority and 
the training to question a physician’s decisions. Moreover, nurses reported that 
when they did question orders, they were often rebuffed, criticized and told “not 
to practice medicine.” One nurse noted, “I’m in charge of quality control and I’ve 
pushed for patient safety, and now, some doctors won’t talk to me.” Nurses 
reported poor access to resources such as authoritative clinical guidelines, and so 
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lacked the confidence, knowledge, training, and authority to question unsafe 
clinical practices.1 these data provided a context for a finding that emerged in one 
of our earlier studies. In that study, nurses reported that their most frequent 
problem involved unclear or confusing orders, and yet nearly one in four nurses 
took no action when encountering that problem.5, 7 
When administrators responded to case studies, they generally acknowledged 
their overall responsibility for ensuring patient safety, but also noted a lack of 
clinical knowledge to determine if clinical events associated with specific cases 
should be deemed as errors. They often referenced a reliance on a medical peer 
review process, noting that “clinical judgment” rests with the physician. Overall, 
pharmacists were quite confident about their own abilities to recognize errors and 
take appropriate action, but noted that organizational and professional barriers 
limited their ability to make systemic changes that could increase safety. For 
example, participating pharmacists who encountered problems in the management 
of warfarin therapies reported that they wanted to establish pharmacist-managed 
warfarin clinics, but encountered resistance among the medical staff. 
We explored these issues further when administering a staff-wide Patient 
Safety Survey. Responses mirrored the findings that emerged in earlier studies. 
Health care providers agreed that patient safety was an important issue and most 
indicated that their hospital had a “no shame/no blame” approach. Most health 
care providers said they were comfortable talking about errors. When asked to 
identify which profession had primary responsibility for ensuring patient safety, 
nearly all respondents assigned that responsibility to nurses. When given a 
medication scenario attributable to nursing, an overwhelming majority of the 
respondents indicated that they believed an error had occurred (97.5 percent) and 
that they would report it (96.3 percent). Only about two-thirds of them, however, 
would tell the patient about this error. However, there was less agreement when 
respondents were given a second case in which a physician failed to prescribe 
appropriate treatment: Only about two-thirds of our respondents indicated that 
they believe an error had occurred, three-quarters of them would report it, and 
slightly more than half of them would tell the patient about it. A sizeable number 
of the respondents in this second case did not respond to the question regarding 
reporting of this error (10.1 percent), or to the question regarding telling the 
patient (8.5 percent).3 
These inconsistencies may provide some insight as to why only a minority (40 
percent) of the respondents to the Patient Safety Survey believed that the error-
related data for their hospital are accurate. Although many simply stated that they 
do not know if data are accurate, almost two-thirds of the pharmacists and nearly 
half of administrators directly indicated that they believe the error-related data are 
not accurate. Those who believed that there was not a general agreement and 
understanding among staff in their hospital about what constitutes an error offered 
two reasons for this situation: inconsistent and vague guidelines; and narrow 
definitions that encompass only medication errors or errors that have caused 
harm.3 In addition, peer pressure and fear were also mentioned as factors 
contributing to this lack of agreement and understanding. 
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Corroborating the findings 
Findings from the various studies were discussed with the key contacts in each 
hospital on a quarterly basis. This activity cross-validated the findings and helped 
uncover issues that required further exploration. For example, when asked to 
explain why diagnosis and treatment problems were rarely identified as errors, a 
common response from nurses was, “We haven’t gone there yet.” A typical 
response from administrators was, “Our medical staff would handle something 
like that. Administration wouldn’t necessarily hear about it.” When explaining 
pharmacy protocols, a pharmacist noted that incorrect medication orders, received 
from physicians, were not logged as errors as long as the pharmacy intercepted 
and corrected them. He noted that as long as the error did not reach the patient, 
“Our doctors don’t think of those things as errors.” A physician who 
acknowledged the need to increase patient safety also noted that errors typically 
involved the administration of medication and so “patient safety is not my role—
it’s a nursing responsibility.” A quality control officer cautioned, “You don’t want 
a flashing blue light” and so events that could be “legally discoverable” should 
not appear in the charts. 
In addition to these constraints, health care providers noted other barriers, 
such as the difficulty in standardizing care or creating effective teams when there 
is a heavy reliance on temporary personnel. At times, they conveyed the fear that 
physicians may leave rural communities if pressured to conform to patient safety 
initiatives, such as use of clinical guides or standards of practice. In nearly every 
conversation, they indicated lack of time to focus on patient safety and noted that 
“time” would be the most valuable of resources. 
Discussion 
The lessons from this research study offer useful insight when designing an 
agenda that supports both basic research activities and the development of 
resources. Although health care research has traditionally relied on experimental, 
control/treatment group design where some subjects receive benefits and others 
do not, qualitative, solution-focused approaches have gained wider acceptance. 
Qualitative methodology seems particularly useful in resource-strapped rural 
areas where assignment to a control group is often viewed as highly unfair and 
unjust. Likewise, the traditional pre/post design is often viewed as highlighting 
one’s lack of skill or ability. Thus there can be considerable resistance to 
participating in studies that employ these methodologies. 
We do not believe that we could have secured the participation of rural 
hospitals if we had proposed the use of a more traditional, experimental model. 
The use of a recursive, multi-method approach was more amenable because it 
fosters a relationship between the researchers and the participants that encourages 
collaboration and honesty while building a foundation for resource development. 
These features correspond to the importance that rural communities place on trust, 
familiarity, and mutual support.6–8 Thus, for extremely busy health care providers, 
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the time expended in this research study seemed worth the investment. Indeed 
throughout the research cycle, health care providers routinely expressed their 
appreciation for the resources and assistance they received, and underscored their 
willingness to remain involved in the project. 
Because we had this level of involvement, this recursive methodology also 
produced a wealth of data that helped identify organizational, as well as intra- and 
inter-personal issues that contribute to patient safety. Some of these issues, such 
as the lack of congruence between one’s conceptual beliefs and one’s behaviors, 
may not have been otherwise observed. If we only measured beliefs, or only 
focused on the kinds of errors that were actually reported, our understanding of 
the complex processes that either hinder or support the creation of safer systems 
would have been more limited and less reliable. 
Finally, this study also provided guidance for the development of resources 
that promote the shared goal of patient safety. The data from the sub-studies 
underscore the fact that rural health care providers want to provide safe care and 
are willing to examine processes and make insightful recommendations that 
increase safety. However, they need to be able to share agreement of definitions 
and learn to discuss patient safety issues in ways that are nonconfrontational and 
neutral. Early in this study, we learned that words like “error” and “mistake” 
create strong reactions that leave lingering and painful memories. When 
participating in the various activities, including interviews, surveys, 
questionnaires, and analysis of case studies, health care providers offered detailed 
and honest accounts of error-related events, some occurring 20–30 years ago, that 
still troubled them. The emotional burden associated with the word error and the 
memories of painful events can hinder or prevent dialogue as well as the 
development of a uniform approach to patient safety. Given this pain, and the 
overall lack of agreement as to definitions and processes for resolution, it takes 
tremendous courage for a person to look at a situation and label it as an error or 
mistake. 
Thus it is imperative to develop processes that encourage health care 
providers to talk about patient safety in ways that promote an open exploration of 
areas of agreement and disagreement. In order to reach that goal, the case study 
model, developed in collaboration with Rush Medical College, was fine-tuned so 
that it focused on the identification of topics, issues, learning points, guides, and 
ideas for improvement, rather than the straightforward identification of errors. By 
focusing on solutions, we obtained a level of engagement and dialogue across 
settings that may not otherwise have been achieved. In addition, health care 
providers reported that once they had successfully discussed the case studies with 
one another, it became easier to raise and discuss issues that were occurring in 
their own settings. These discussions, in turn, have led to new understandings of 
team processes, including an appreciation of ways that health care providers can 
offer useful and time-saving services to one another. 
Finally, we learned that resources can be easily and affordably delivered via e-
mail, an issue of importance in financially constrained and geographically isolated 
rural communities where high tech solutions are often viewed with skepticism. 
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Approaches such as computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems, for 
example, seem unaffordable. Throughout this study, health care providers 
reiterated the need for technologies that are affordable, accessible, time-sensitive, 
and designed for generalists who work in several departments on a daily basis. 
Since participating, rural health care providers had a basic understanding of e-
mail and many of the hospitals had Web sites, a mechanism for ongoing dialogue 
and the exchange of information was put in place for the duration of the study. 
Conclusion 
Our data indicate that rural health care professionals are genuinely concerned 
about patient safety. They care for people they see every day on Main Street; their 
lives intersect in the local schools, churches, clubs, stores, and Little League 
teams. They have a high regard for the network of relationships that tie a 
community together, often noting, “We are in this together.” 
At the same time, a network of relationships does not guarantee mutual 
understanding or shared visions. As a result, decisions about recognizing, 
reporting, and disclosing errors that occur in rural health care settings have far-
reaching consequences. As one administrator noted, “It takes a long time to build 
trust and no time to lose it.” 
Thus rural health care providers strongly affirmed the need for resources that 
have been developed and tested for the rural environment. They want access to 
guides and standards of practice that can be implemented in their small settings. 
They want to know what measures will tell them they are on the right track. 
Above all, they want integrative, interdisciplinary approaches that will help 
promote and sustain dialogue. 
Although our project has added to the knowledge base relative to patient 
safety in rural areas, more study is needed. One rural health care provider noted, 
“I signed on for the project because it had the word ‘rural.’ You don’t see that 
very much.” We believe the lessons learned from this project regarding the 
organizational, intra- and inter-individual factors that contribute to patient safety, 
as well as the areas of need and methods for development and dissemination of 
resources should guide the future research and intervention. Although the 
traditional research designs using methodologies such as a random assignment to 
experimental and control groups are often not feasible in resource-strapped rural 
settings, the use of scientifically rigorous design and psychometrically sound 
measures is important in order to obtain findings that are reliable and valid as well 
as to make causal inferences in field settings. Consistent with the literature on 
conducting research in these settings,13 we encourage supplementing the use of 
various quasi-experimental designs with the use of multivariate data, careful 
assessment of initial differences among participants, and valid operationalization 
of measures. In addition, the use of a recursive, multi-method approach that 
fosters a mutually rewarding relationship between the researchers and the 
participants, and encourages collaboration and trust is of utmost importance in 
order to ensure successful outcomes of patient safety projects in rural areas. 
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